



















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3090 
CATEGORY 7: MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
JUNE 2010 
 





An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









Remittances have greatly increased during recent years, becoming an important and reliable 
source of funds for many developing countries. Therefore, there is a strong incentive for 
receiving countries to attract more remittances, especially through formal channels that turn to 
be either less expensive or less risky. One way of doing so is to increase their financial 
openness, but this policy option might generate additional costs in terms of macroeconomic 
volatility. In this paper we investigate the link between remittance receipts and financial 
openness. We develop a small model and statistically test for the existence of such a 
relationship with a sample of 66 mostly developing countries from 1980-2005. Empirically 
we use a dynamic generalized ordered logit model to deal with the categorical nature of the 
financial openness policy. We apply a two-step method akin to two stage least squares to deal 
with the endogeneity of remittances and potential measurement errors. We find a strong 
positive statistical and economic effect of remittances on financial openness. 
JEL-Code: E60, F24, F41, O10. 
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Ocial global remittances sent to developing countries have reached 300 billion
US dollar in 2008 and have become a signicant source of income for many
of these developing countries. In fact, for quite a few countries remittance
receipts exceed 20% of GDP (e.g. Guyana, Honduras, Jordan and several more).
These remittances appear to be a stable source of income over time , compared
to e.g. foreign direct investment, and their value quite often exceeds ocial
development aid. The importance of remittances has been recognized by policy
makers, global institutions, such as the World Bank, and academics alike.1
A growing academic literature has been devoted to analyze the microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic eects of remittances in developing countries (see
Schi and Ozden, 2006, 2007, for a synthesis). The eects of remittances on re-
ceiving countries seem indeed numerous. At a microeconomic level, remittances
have been found to boost investment in human capital and educational attain-
ments, thereby reducing poverty in many developing countries. Furthermore,
there is signicant evidence that remittances increase not only consumption
but tend to also raise health levels and investment in public infrastructure. At
a macroeconomic level, the existence of a positive relationship between remit-
tances and growth is more controversial. While remittances tend to favor the
accumulation of important production factors such as physical capital and edu-
cation, they exert detrimental eects in terms of labor market incentives. They
also create 'Dutch disease' eects through the appreciation of domestic curren-
cies, leading to further deindustrialization in the receiving country. Neverthe-
less, the recent literature shows that appropriately used migrant remittances,
combined with sound government policies, have a positive net eect on economic
growth.
The growing importance of remittances and their positive impact on the
economic conditions in receiving countries create for their governments strong
incentives to facilitate the attraction of those ows. In some countries such as
Mexico and the Philippines, explicit programs have been set up to increase the
ows of the received remittances. Among the possible schemes aimed at boosting
these receipts, the opening of nancial borders is a possible policy instrument of
governments. By decreasing the cost of the remittances sent through the ocial
way or by relaxing the restriction of nancial ows coming from abroad, govern-
ments can signicantly boost the total amount of the received funds. Financial
openness creates, however, new costs and risks for the receiving countries. One
of the most important costs is the increased exposure to nancial crises and to
1In particular, given the importance of the remittances for a large set of countries, the
World Bank devoted substantial eorts to monitor, understand and forecast remittance ows.
See website link www.go.worldnak.org/ssw3DDNL.
2macroeconomic instability. Therefore, the nal decision to open the nancial
borders is likely to result from a trade-o between the various benets drawn
from the attracted remittances and the increased macroeconomic risk. In turn,
those benets will depend on the initial size of the incoming remittances, which
depend on a set of factors unrelated to nancial openness. Those factors include
among others the size of the existing diaspora and their location.
In this paper, we proceed to a political economy investigation of the choice
of the degree of nancial openness by government with respect to their situation
in terms of incoming remittances. We rst develop a small model that expresses
the trade o faced by government in their decision to open the nancial borders.
We show that the optimal degree of openness depends on the initial size of the
incoming remittances which in turn depends on factors that are exogenous for
the government, such as the size the total diaspora, its location or the economic
conditions of the destination countries. Then, we investigate empirically that
link for a sample of 66 mostly developing countries from 1980-2005. Financial
openness is classied according to three regimes (closed, neutral or open) based
on the KAOPEN nancial openness indicator of Chinn and It^ o (2008). In
addition to remittances we account for institutional quality, trade openness and
domestic nancial development.
Empirically we use a dynamic generalized ordered logit model to establish the
link between remittances and nancial openness. This framework is attractive
because it is well suited to deal with the ordinal nature of the nancial openness
indicator. Moreover, it is possible to take unobserved heterogeneity into account.
In addition, we apply a two-step method akin to two stage least squares to deal
with the endogeneity of remittance receipts and potential measurement errors.
To preview our results, we nd a strong positive eect of remittances on
nancial openness. The more remittances a country receives, the more likely it
will be nancially open. The positive eect of remittances on nancial openness
is robust to instrumentation of remittances, both in a balanced and unbalanced
sample.
A counterfactual analysis shows that remittances have an important eect
on country's nancial openness policy. Results indicate that large remittance
receiving countries have a much larger probability of being nancially closed
when they do not receive remittances anymore.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst review the existing related liter-
ature and provide some stylized facts(Section 2). In Section 3 we introduce a
theoretical model that captures the trade-o between the benets and the costs
of opening the nancial borders and hence the determinants of the government's
decision. The empirical model and results are discussed in Section 4. In Section
5 we study two counterfactual scenarios to assess the economic importance of
3remittance receipts for individual countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivation, existing related literature and styl-
ized facts
In this section, we cover the related literature. Our paper provides a political
economy analysis of the choice of nancial openness based on the incentive to
attract remittances from abroad. It is thus related to the literature on the eects
of remittances and the one dealing with nancial integration. We also provide
specic examples of governmental schemes. Finally, we provide preliminary
evidence in favour of a link between the cost to remit and the degree of nancial
openness of the receiving country.
2.1 Related literature on the eects of remittances
The exiting literature on the impact of remittances suggests that remittances
exert important eects on the economic situation of the receiving countries.
The academic debate has focused on both micro- and macroeconomic ef-
fects of remittances. First, a number of micro studies investigate the poverty
reduction eect of remittances. Country studies show that remittances play an
important role in reducing poverty in e.g. Lesotho (Gustafsson and Makonnen,
1993), Guatemala (Adams, 2006) and Mexico (Acosta et al., 2006). A second
strand investigates how remittance recipients spend their receipts. In general,
households either consume or invest their receipts, where investment (especially
in human capital) can potentially accelerate future economic growth. Recent
studies (e.g. Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003;
Adams, 2006) show that a sizable fraction of remittances are invested in edu-
cation, health care and physical assets. Indeed, beyond the direct eect that
remittances exert on spending, the fact that households receive money from
abroad can be seen as a strong increase in collateral that in turn might increase
investment. Remittances alleviate liquidity constraints that can act as impor-
tant constrains on investment in education in a set of developing countries. In
countries with a minimal level of banking development, the permanent inow of
remittances can act as a collateral for borrowing by the households. In turn, this
might favour investment in human capital, small businesses or infrastructure.
Finally, since remittances give rise to some increase in aggregate consumption,
this leads to increase in public revenues in countries that tax consumption.
In response, macroeconomic studies started to focus on the eects of remit-
tances on economic growth. While there is ample evidence that remittances
4reduce poverty (Adams and Page, 2005) and boost aggregate demand, the ef-
fects on growth are not clear cut. One reason is that remittances might alter the
behaviour of receiving households (the so-called moral hazard eects) or induce
price developments that are detrimental for the development of the country.
One of these eect is the so-called Dutch Disease eect through which the ow
of remittances induces a real exchange rate appreciation that aects negatively
the activity of the tradable manufacturing sector (Acosta et al., 2009).
However, recent studies nd that remittances have a positive impact on eco-
nomic growth. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) show that in the economies
where the nancial system is underdeveloped, remittances alleviate credit con-
straints and work as a substitute for nancial development, improving the al-
location of capital and therefore accelerating economic growth. On the other
hand, Mundaca (2009) shows that nancial development potentially leads to
better use of remittances, thus fostering growth. Recent research conducted by
Aggarwal et al. (2006) also shows that remittances may directly promote nan-
cial development. In particular, they nd that remittances have a signicant
and positive impact on bank deposits to GDP. Overall, the literature nds that
net eect on growth seems to be positive, without even considering the positive
impact remittances can have on the income distribution.
2.2 Government policies
The favourable eects of remittances on the economic situation of receiving
countries have induced some governments to implement specic programs to
promote remittance receipts.
The Philippines provides a clear-cut example, where the government ex-
plicitly promotes emigration to receive remittances. In 1982, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) has been created by Executive
Order No. 797. Article I of this order clearly mentions the main objectives:
 \3. Recruitment and place workers to service the requirements of overseas
employers for trained and competent Filipino workers;"
 \4. Promote the development of skills and careful selection of Filipino
workers for overseas employment;"
 \7. Generate Foreign exchange from the earnings of Filipinos employed
under its programs;"
These objectives clearly show that the Philippine government's aim is to
maximize remittance receipts. Moreover, articles VII and IX state the objectives
even clearer:
5 \k. Formulate and implement programs for the eective monitoring of
foreign exchange remittances of overseas contract workers." (Art. VII,
Sec. 31)
 \4. Maximize foreign exchange generation from Filipino workers and sea-
men;" (Art. IX, Sec. 37)
The Mexican program Citizen Initiative 3x1 (Iniciativa Ciudadana 3x1 in
Spanish) is another example of a government initiated scheme to promote re-
mittance receipts from migrants. In the United States Mexican migrants run
over 2000 so called Hometown Associations (HTAs), which support their local
communities in Mexico. Under Citizen Initiative 3x1 remittances from Mexican
HTAs are matched with local, state and federal governments' funds to nance
mostly basic infrastructure in rural areas. By investing in basic infrastructure,
such as building roads, bridges and irrigation systems, necessary conditions are
created for economic growth. In eect, remittances are generous and in some
municipalities the funds received by Citizen Initiative 3x1 are larger than the
municipality's total budget (Orozco and Lapointe, 2004).
By matching migrant's remittances the Mexican government is able to chan-
nel remittance receipts to productive use, which benets the country's long term
growth. In addition, the development of rural areas reduces the problems in-
duced by urbanization, e.g. lack of proper housing for Mexico City's expanding
population. The success of the program is enormous and the only problem the
government faces is that
\[t]he amounts committed to the program by HTAs has increased so rapidly
in recent years that, at times, the government does not have the budget to match
the funds" (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005, p. 123).
While some specic microeconomic programs such as those presented above
might be desirable, there are complementary macroeconomic reforms that can
be implemented on a larger scale.2 One example is the choice of the exchange
rate regime. Freund and Spatafora (2008) nd that the existence of multiple
exchange rates signicantly reduces the amount of recorded remittances. Singer
(2009) shows that the size of incoming remittances increase the likelihood that
policymakers of developing countries will adopt xed exchange rates. Our paper
considers an alternative policy option , i.e. the openness of the nancial borders.
Financial liberalization turns out to be a more global option encompassing the
choice of the exchange rate regime.3
2For several other examples of government programs to promote remittance receipts see
e.g. Maimbo and Ratha (2005).
3Our indicator of nancial openness includes the existence of multiple exchange rates for
instance.
6Financial liberalization exerts two speci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First, nancial liberalization facilitates foreign nancial transactions. In case of
nancial autarky, it is almost impossible for some migrants to send remittances
through the formal way. While informal ways can always be relied on and
are not always more expensive at rst glance, these involve much more risk.
Furthermore, the informal channel is often used for illegal purposes, with the
danger of being considered as a criminal.4 For some pairs of countries that are
quite distant, physical transportation of money might be not only dangerous
but also may involve higher costs. Second, more nancial openness will also
lower (formal) remittances' transaction costs and will provide incentives to send
remittances trough the formal market. Financial borders are often associated
to controls and constraints on international nancial ows such as foreign direct
investments, portfolio investments and remittances sent through the banking
system. This leads to an increase in the cost and to lower transfers compared
to a liberalized regime.
2.3 Stylized facts
To illustrate the impact of nancial openness on the cost of sending remittances,
Table 1 provides the results of a gravity regression relating the (bilateral) cost
of sending remittances from country i to country j and the degree of nancial
openness in country j. The cost of sending remittances denoted by cij is drawn
from the new dataset built by the World Bank on the remittance costs across
134 country corridors, involving 14 sending countries and 72 potential receiving
countries. The data come from a survey conducted by the World Bank and are
available only for 2008 and 2009.5
The World bank data include two components of the cost of remitting, i.e.
the exchange rate margin associated to currency conversion and the xed fee
associated to the international transfer. The data reveals that the total cost
of remitting can be substantial. Total costs of more than 15 percent are not
unusual. Furthermore, those costs are observed for the most popular transfer
corridors. They might be expected to be even more important for remitting
between less popular country pairs. We report here the regression results ob-
tained with the cost of sending 500 USD but we get quite the same qualitative
conclusions with the other measure based on the cost of sending 200 USD.
In line with Beck and Peria (2009), we account for factors that are bilat-
eral to i and j, origin specic and destination specic. Since our purpose is
4See for instance http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/
Hawala/default.asp about the Hawala system, one of the most popular informal channels
for remittances, and money laundering.
5The full data and the related explanations are available at www.remittanceprices.org.
7to focus on the impact on destination specic factors such as nancial open-
ness and since our dataset is only cross-sectional, we capture the origin specic
factors by xed eects, denoted by i. Included bilateral factors are the log
of distance between the two countries, the log of the stock of migrants from
country j living in country i, the existence of colonial links and a common
ocial language. For convenience in exposition, these factors are collected in
the matrix xij;k in Equation (1). The destination specic factors include some
index of bank concentration (Herndahl index) to capture the impact of bank
competition (denoted by bankj) and our index of nancial integration (denoted
by kaopenj). The index of nancial integration we use in this paper is the
KAOPEN index developed by Chinn and It^ o (2008). We provide more informa-
tion on this indicator in Section 4.1. The higher the index, the more nancially
open a country is.
The estimated equation is:
cij = i + 1kaopenj + 2bankj +
X
k
kxij;k + ij (1)
The results in Table 1 shed light on the relationship between nancial open-
ness and the cost of sending remittances through the ocial channel. In both
specications reported in Table 1, 1 is found to be negative and signicant
at the 5 percent level. The results show that the higher the openness of the
receiving countries, the lower the cost to send remittances to that country,
everything equal elsewhere. The results suggest that one reason to open the
nancial borders for governments of remittances receiving countries is to lower
the transaction costs. In turn, this should increase the total amount sent by the
migrants, especially since the cost is supported by them.




bank concentration host 4.347*** 3.991***
(0.919) (0.842)










Note: Estimation of Equation (1) using OLS, with
robust standard errors. *,**,*** imply signicance
at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
8The World Bank dataset also reveals an important feature concerning the
operating country corridors. The dataset covers 14 sending countries and 72
receiving countries. Nevertheless, prices were obtained by the surveyors of the
WB only for 134 country corridors. This means that the dataset contains 87
percent of missing observations. Of course, the reasons of those missing obser-
vations might be numerous. Part of the missing data might be due to the fact
that it is possible to send remittances but that the cost was unknown by the
service providers at the time of the survey. In turn, the prices might be unknown
because there is little demand for that particular corridor. Importantly, some
missing data might also reect that some or all service providers do not oer
that service for this particular country corridor. Whatever the various reasons,
the important proportion of missing data for the costs of sending remittances
suggests that in many case, sending remittances through the formal channel
might be cumbersome for the migrants. Part of the impossibility of sending
remittances to a particular country might be due to the fact that the country
is not fully opened to international nancial ows.
2.4 Financial openness as an option
A related literature in international nance investigates the relationship be-
tween capital account/nancial openness, nancial development and economic
growth.6 A large number of studies nd a positive eect of nancial openness
on economic growth (e.g. Quinn, 1997; Bekaert et al., 2005; Quinn and Toyoda,
2008). However, this positive view is challenged by others (e.g. Edison et al.,
2002). Klein and Olivei (2008) argue that the lack of a positive growth eect
of nancial openness in developing countries is due to a missing eect of nan-
cial openness on nancial development for these countries. However, Chinn and
It^ o (2006) do nd a positive eect of nancial openness on domestic nancial
development if the institutional quality in the country is of a suciently high
level.
The importance of threshold levels of institutional quality and macroeco-
nomic policies has been advocated further by Kose et al. (2009). Due to the
positive eects of remittances on macroeconomic stability and nancial develop-
ment, it is attractive for remittance receiving countries to liberalize their capital
account and increase their nancial openness to accelerate economic growth.
Hence, remittances can have an important direct eect on a developing coun-
tries' nancial openness and therefore an indirect impact on growth. However,
6Remittances are recorded in both the current and capital account of the balance of pay-
ments. Hence, when we refer to capital account/nancial openness this ought to be interpreted
not strictly as capital account transactions. Therefore, we use the more general term nancial
openness to assess the ease of sending and receiving remittances.
9nancial openness does not only have positive eects, but also creates costs for
governments. First, from the Mundell-Fleming model we know that the govern-
ment needs to give up either exchange rate stability or monetary policy when
allowing the free movement of capital. If the government aims to control all
three factors, countries risk being hit by speculative attacks, where the only op-
tion left is to devaluate the currency. The Argentine experience during the early
2000s is an illustrative example. In order to curtail ination in the early 1990s
Argentina pegged its currency to the US$. Due to large public decits (nanced
in part by the Central Bank) and a revaluation of the US$ vs. the Brazilian
real and the euro made Argentina's export sector uncompetitive. Hence, both
imports and foreign debt increased. This resulted in a severe economic crisis
and in 2002 the peg with the US$ was abandoned.
Second, nancial openness induces potential contagion eects, where healthy
countries can become aected due to ill neighbors. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(2000) show the important role of the nancial sector and how the actions
of nancial market participants can lead to instability, facilitated by nancial
openness. This contagion risk was especially prevailing during the 1997 Asian
nancial crisis, where countries such as Korea had sound macroeconomic poli-
cies, but entered in economic hardship due to capital ight induced by herd
behavior. In addition, nancial openness increases the comovement of stock
markets, especially in times of crisis (Beine et al., 2010). Hence, countries will
become more integrated in the world economy and be less able to steer their own
economy. The potential positive and negative eects of nancial openness need
to be weighted by governments in their choice regarding the degree of nancial
openness. More specically for developing countries, they need to weight the
positive eects of remittances to the potential risks of increased macroeconomic
volatility.
3 The Model
This section formalizes the trade o a remittance receiving country's govern-
ment faces: the positive economic eects of remittance receipts vs. potentially
increasing macroeconomic instability. To keep the model tractable and intuitive,
we consider a simple static model with 3 decision agents: one migrant remitter
(m), one recipient household (f), which can consist of one or more individuals,
and the government of the receiving household's country whose objective it is
to maximize revenues.7
7In this section we want to introduce a very simple and intuitive model to provide insights
in the underlying mechanisms of the government's nancial openness policy. We decide to use
a static model for illustrative purposes since a dynamic model will be much more complex,
being beyond the scope of this section. The empirical model we are going to test includes
103.1 The household
The representative household's utility is a function of family consumption, zf.
Family consumption depends on the family income generated in the source coun-
try, If, that without loss of generality can be set equal to 0, and remittances,
R, sent by the representative migrant remitter. Therefore the income of the
family depends on remittances sent from abroad.
Even if the literature shows that remittances can be either consumed or in-
vested in the form of land, housing acquisition, health, education, and microen-
terprises (for example Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Woodru and Zenteno,
2001), for simplicity, we assume that the household consumes all the income.
More formally, considering a standard functional form for the utility function
Uf, the representative household maximizes:
Uf = ln(zf); (2)
subject to their budget constraint:
zf(1 + tc) = If + R: (3)
The price of consumption is normalized to 1. Remittances are not directly
taxed by the government, but indirectly taxed through an ad valorem consump-
tion tax. The assumption that remittances are not directly taxed is in line
with the general practice of avoiding taxing these ows by governments in the
recipient countries (see for example World Bank, 2006).
3.2 The migrant
The representative migrant's utility Um depends on his own consumption, zm,
and on the utility of the recipient household, whose importance in the migrants'
utility function is represented by the altruistic parameter  2 (0;1).8
Um = ln(zm) + ln(zf): (4)
In order to determine the optimal level of remittances, the migrant maxi-
dynamics.
8For ease of exposition we consider only altruism as the migrant's motivation to remit, and
we follow a similar way of modeling as in Rapoport and Docquier (2006) (See e.g. Rapoport
and Docquier (2006) and Carling (2008) for alternative motives). Here, it is only important
that the migrant is willing to remit part of his income, irrespective of the exact motives.
11mizes his utility function subject to his budget constraint, given by:
zm = Im   R(1 + ); (5)
where zm denotes consumption of the migrant, Im and R denote respec-
tively the income of the migrant and the amount of remittances. The price of
consumption, as before, is normalized to 1, therefore, prices are assumed to be
the same across the host and origin country. However, this assumption does not
change any of the substantive implications of the model. The cost of sending re-
mittances depends on the parameter , a kind of iceberg cost, which reects the
degree of nancial openness of the migrant origin country. The more open the
country is, the less costly is to send remittances home and vice versa. Costs can
be interpreted in a broader sense, i.e. in terms of easiness of the transactions.9
Ruling out the possibility of negative transfers from the migrant to the house-
hold, the maximization problem of the migrant can be written as:
max
R
Um = ln(Im   R(1 + )) + ln((If + R)=(1 + t))
= ln(Im   R(1 + )) + ln(If + R)   ln(1 + t): (6)
The rst order condition is given by:
@Um=@R =  
1 + 





and the optimal amount of remittances is
R =
Im





Doing some comparative-statics, it is easy to see that the model predicts that
transfers to the origin household increase with the income of the migrant, @R
@Im >
0, and with the altruistic parameter, @R
@ > 0, and decrease with the wealth of
the origin family, @R
@If < 0. Moreover, transfers are decreasing in , @R
@ < 0,
predicting that the more the home country is nancially closed, the less migrants
are going to remit.
9The cost can be interpreted also as the \risks in sending remittances". It is plausible
to think that a more open nancial system provides incentives to use the formal system
in sending remittances, therefore lowering the risks faced when sending money through the
informal channel. A lower risk will induce more remittances. Here, we do not distinguish
between formal and informal remittances, as only the formal ones are observed.
123.3 The government
The government chooses the degree of nancial openness in order to maximize its
revenues, which it derives from taxing consumption. Since remittances are fully
spend on consumption, the government tries to maximize remittances receipts.
Hence, the government has a strong incentive to open its nancial borders to
attract remittances. On the other hand, controls are benecial, because they
insulate domestic markets from external shocks. Ceteris paribus, the more open
a country is, the higher is capital ow volatility, the probability of external
shocks and economic crises.10 Naturally, the risk of incurring a nancial crisis
depends on several country characteristics, e.g. institutional quality.
We introduce a simple cost function to capture the risk-cost of the govern-
ment. The government incurs a country-specic cost , which it will pay with
probability  2 [0;1]. We assume that the probability is decreasing in , and
it is equal to 0 when  ! +1 (fully closed) and equal to 1 when  = 0 (fully
open).
More formally, the government maximization problem is given by
max





(If + R)   ; (9)










From Equation (8) it is easy to see that @R
@ < 0, predicting that the more
nancially closed the home country is, the less migrants are going to remit.
At the same time @
@ is negative, meaning that the more the home country is
nancially closed, the lower the probability to pay a cost . In order to determine
the optimum level of , the government faces the trade-o between the expected
earnings that it will derive from the (indirect) taxation of remittances and the
expected cost of opening, cost depending on country characteristics.
For given t, then the optimum  will depend negatively on R and positively
on ,  = (R;). In case of interior solution, the government may choose a 
which reects intermediate or limited openness.
More explicitly, for analytical tractability, let's take the particular case for
10Alesina et al. (1994) list four main motives for capital controls: (i) limit volatile capital
ows; (ii) maintain the domestic tax base; (iii) retain domestic savings; and (iv) sustain
structural reform. Even if Alesina et al. (1994) identify the governments' attempt to collect
revenue from nancial repression as the main motive for controls, there are a lot of examples
where nancial crises were mainly due to capital ights (for example the Asian crisis in 1997).
13the crisis probability  = 1
(1+)2. After some calculations, the optimum level of









Doing some comparative statics, it is easy to see that the optimum level of 
depends negatively on Im, , t, and positively on . This shows that the higher
the cost of opening , the higher  (lower nancial openness), and the higher the
income of the migrant and its degree of altruism, the lower  (higher nancial
openness). This last observation implies that the optimal level of nancial
openness depends positively on remittances, because remittances in their turn
are positively related to Im, and , and therefore related to factors which include
migrants' destination country characteristics. Given , it is possible to calculate







the optimal level of remittances depends negatively, among other things, on
the cost of opening ( @R

@ < 0). Therefore, the higher the cost of opening,
the lower the degree of nancial openness and the lower the optimal amount of
remittances.
All these results provide us with a testable prediction: for given character-
istics of the country, the higher the level of remittances, the more nancially
open the country will be. In testing for this relationship, a case for intermedi-
ate or limited openness should be accounted for. Moreover, it is important to
control for reverse causality, as the migrant's decision to remit will depend on
the degree of nancial openness, as suggested by equation 8.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Measuring Financial Openness Policy
We use the KAOPEN measure, constructed by Chinn and It^ o (2008), to capture
the degree of barriers to remitting money for migrants. The major advantage
of this indicator is that it includes a large set of factors aecting the possibility
and the cost of remitting. KAOPEN is based on the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The AREAER
reports tables, which summarize for each country the restrictions on foreign
transactions that are in place. For each type of restrictions, there is either a
one if restrictions are present or zero if no restrictions are in place. However, to
calculate KAOPEN these zeros and ones are reversed to construct a measure of
openness, where one implies open and zero closed.
14The following four categories are considered in KAOPEN: i) The presence of
multiple exchange rates (K1
it), ii) Restrictions on current account transactions
(K2
it), iii) Restrictions on capital account transactions (K3
it) and iv) Requirement
of surrender of export proceeds (K4
it). To calculate the third category a ve year













KAOPEN's broadness is an important advantage compared to considering
only a single indicator. In general, the correlation between the various com-
ponents and the KAOPEN is quite high: 0.384 for K1, 0.788 for K2, 0.83 for
K3 and 0.88 for K4 (Chinn and It^ o, 2008). For remittances, the restrictions
on current and capital account transactions are the most important categories.
We will discuss in more detail how each category in KAOPEN matters for the
remitting migrant.
Migrant remittances are dened as the sum of workers' remittances, com-
pensation of employees, and migrants' transfers. The rst two categories are
recorded in the current account and the third in the capital account. The dis-
tinction on current and capital account depends to a large degree on the number
of years the migrant lives in the sending country. However, the World Bank
states: \Although the residence guideline in the manual is clear, this rule is of-
ten not followed for various reasons" (World Bank Data Factsheet). Countries
do not all consistently record a certain type of transfer in the specic balance
of payments account. For example, in Brazil about 20% of total remittances
are recorded in the capital account. Other countries simply pool all three cate-
gories in a single account, usually the current account. Therefore there is a lot
of arbitrariness. Hence, it is important to consider both restrictions on current
and capital transfers to accurately capture the barriers to remit. The high cor-
relation between KAOPEN and both these subcomponents is very important,
because restrictions on these transaction channels aect remitters strongest.
Some clear examples of restrictions are the requirement to repatriate all for-
eign currency proceeds for residents in Morocco and Tunisia. This will discour-
age migrants to remit when the exchange rate is not very attractive. Further-
more, return migration is discouraged. The 2000 edition of the IMF's AREAER
states for Tunisia: \Nonresident Tunisian nationals returning to denitively to
the country must declare and repatriate their assets or proceeds and revenue
from their holdings abroad." Some countries, e.g. the Philippines allow for
foreign currency deposits. However, the 1985 AREAER states: \Philippine
nationals working abroad are required to repatriate minimum shares of their
foreign earnings, ranging from 50 percent to 80 percent". These conditions have
been relaxed during the past decades, but are important during the time frame
15we study.
Other examples include Vietnam, which mandates migrants to invest 30
percent of their remittances in a government fund. Some countries, such as
Colombia and Ecuador tax remittances, whereas others, e.g. Brazil, mandate
that all foreign exchange go through the central bank (Agunias, 2006). However,
during the eighties and nineties more countries imposed restrictions, but many
of these were abandoned once the governments realized the positive eects of
remittances. The AREAER indicates that quite a few countries require the
surrender of export proceeds. This requirement is also closely related to the
mandatory conversion of foreign currencies into domestic currency. While not
aecting directly migrants, the requirement of surrender of export proceeds
might be considered as reecting some uncertainty regarding the extortion of
remittances. Hence, including this factor in KAOPEN helps to obtain a more
complete picture of the total nancial openness policy of a country.
The existence of multiple exchange rates creates extra costs for migrants
remitting. In fact, Freund and Spatafora (2008) show that the existence of mul-
tiple exchange rates signicantly reduces the amount of recorded remittances.
In addition, the World Bank data on the cost of remitting shows that there are
sizeable exchange rate margins (extra costs above interbank rate) for several
countries when remitting internationally. For example, when transferring from
the U.S. to Brazil the average exchange rate margin is around 3%, from the
U.K. to Kenya 5%, from France to Morocco 2%, Canada to India 5%, etcetera.
There is quite some competition in these remittance corridors, so costs will be
even higher for less popular country pairs. Those exchange rate margins are of
course added to the xed fee associated to the transfer.
Dual exchange rates are still in place for a large number of countries (Rein-
hart and Rogo, 2004). As remitters are most likely low priority, they will not
receive the most favorable exchange rate, which makes remitting less attractive.
However, countries receiving large amounts of remittances are more likely to
opt for a xed exchange rate regime (Singer, 2009). Naturally, xed exchange
rates reduce the costs of remitting. Hence, we expect large remittance receiving
countries to have a very low probability of a double exchange rate regime.
Quite often a dual exchange rate regime is in place after a balance of pay-
ments crisis. For example, India opted for a dual exchange rate regime in 1992
right after the balance of payments crisis of 1991. Basically, there was an ocial
rate for selected government and private transactions and a market determined
rate for all other transactions. Naturally, this market rate was worse than the
ocial rate.
To sum up, the KAOPEN index is a broad indicator of nancial openness,
which captures a set of various relevant factors aecting the cost of remitting.
16It is therefore more representative of the overall policy of a country regarding
its degree of nancial openness. As we are interested in government policy mea-
sures, de facto indicators of nancial openness policy based on parity conditions
or cross border asset holdings are of limited use to address this paper's research
question.
Due to its straightforward and transparent construction KAOPEN is avail-
able for virtually all countries in the world. The indicator is easily constructed
and therefore annually updated.11 This large coverage is necessary to analyze
the large number of countries in this study. In this paper a subset of 66 coun-
tries is considered. This restricted set of 66 countries is due to the exclusion of
OECD countries and the requirement of full data availability for KAOPEN and
remittances data from 1980 until 2005. Alternative nancial openness policy
indicators by Quinn (1997) and Miniane (2004) do not cover a large enough
country span and do not fully cover the timeframe we consider.12 For the com-
mon country/timeframe KAOPEN shows a strong correlation with the other
two indicators.
Figure 1 shows a quantile graph of the KAOPEN database pooling all 66
countries across all years. The values of KAOPEN range between about -1.9
and 2.6. Note that these values are not of a cardinal nature, i.e. -1 is not twice
as closed as -0.5. The higher KAOPEN the more nancially open a country is.
Figure 1: Quantile graph of KAOPEN 1980-2005
11The data and a detailed description on its construction are available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/mchinn/research.html. Recently, an updated version of the
database up to 2007 has been released.
12For a detailed comparison of dierent indicators we refer to Edison et al. (2004) and
Miniane (2004).
17As many countries have become nancially open during 1980-2005, the over-
all mean of KAOPEN increases over time. The largest increases took place
during the 1990s when many developing countries chose to open their capital
account. Another characteristic of this variable is its strong persistence over
time.
A closer inspection of Figure 1 reveals that many observations have exactly
the same value. There appear to be several \levels" of nancial openness, with
only few observations in between these levels. These levels can be associated
with the number of restrictions in the subcategories of KAOPEN. The low-
est level (-1.91) implies that all four subcomponents of KAOPEN are closed,
the second lowest (-1.13) represent that three out of four channels are closed,
etcetera. The top level (2.54) represents those countries with all four categories
open.
The categorical nature of KAOPEN casts doubt on the appropriateness of
treating it as a continuous variable in regression models. Therefore, this charac-
teristic will be important for our choice of estimation method. We will elaborate
on this issue in Section 4.2 below.
4.1.2 Control Variables
Remittances. Data on remittances are taken from the World Bank and they
are based on the IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (2008). With
some exceptions, these data are constructed as the sum of three items in the
Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook: workers' remittances (part of the cur-
rent transfers in the current account), compensation of employees (part of the
income component of the current account), and migrant transfers (part of the
capital account). More specically, workers' remittances include current trans-
fers made by migrants who are employed and resident in another economy,
typically include transfers of workers who move to another country and stay
for one year or longer; compensation of employees consists of wages, salaries
and other benets earned by nonresident workers for work performed for res-
ident of other countries, typically include earnings from border and seasonal
workers. Finally, migrant transfers comprises nancial items that arise from the
migration or change of residence of individuals from one economy to another.
Data from the IMF/World Bank are recognized as the best available data
on remittances. Unfortunately, this data does not take into account remit-
tances sent through informal channels (for example, money transfer that do not
involve any formal contracts). Freund and Spatafora (2008) provide a table
summarizing the results of earlier studies on the estimated fraction of unocial
remittances compared to ocial inows in several countries. This table shows
18that are quite a few dierences between countries and that the share of unocial
remittances may be quite high in some cases. For example, the share of infor-
mal remittances is quite low in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, 5%
and 15% respectively. However, in other countries the majority of remittances
received may be unocial, e.g. Bangladesh 54% and Uganda 80%.13
Other data. In order to explain the determinants of nancial openness,
data drawn from a several number of sources are considered.
Financial development measures. Measures of nancial development are ex-
tracted from the data set of Beck et al. (2000). In particular we consider the
ratio of bank credit over bank deposit and a measure of liquid liabilities over
GDP.
Institutional quality measures. In order to consider the importance of in-
stitutional quality on the degree of nancial openness, we use the composite
Polity2 index from the Polity IV data set, which is the dierence between the
Polity's democracy and autocracy indices. It ranges from -10 (strongly auto-
cratic countries) to + 10 (strongly democratic countries). Polity IV contains
annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent
countries. Legal origin dummies, taken from La Porta et al. (1999) are also
considered.
Trade Openness. It is often claimed that trade openness is a pre-condition
for nancial openness (e.g. Chinn and It^ o, 2002; Tornell et al., 2004). To test
this hypothesis a variable capturing trade openness is included. In particular,
we include the updated version of Sachs and Warner's trade policy openness
indicator of Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
Macro-economic control variables. To control for the level of development
of the economy, per capita GDP from the World Development Indicators and
income dummies according to the World Bank classication are considered.
4.2 Gologit model
The categorical nature of the nancial openness indicator KAOPEN warrants an
empirical estimation technique able to deal with this type of data.14 We choose
to employ the Generalized Ordered Logit Model (gologit) for this purpose.15
The choice for the number of categories is guided by the distribution of the data
in Figure 1 and the properties of the gologit model. The number of categories
should be in proportion to the number of data points, i.e. choosing too many
13Possible eects of unrecorded remittances on the estimation results are discussed in Section
4.4.
14Appendix B reports results based on estimations where KAOPEN is treated as a contin-
uous variables. These results are discussed in Section 4.4.
15For a detailed exposition on the gologit model we refer to Williams (2006). We use Richard
Williams' gologit2 Stata module to estimate the model.
19categories will result in estimation problems.
We opt for three nancial openness categories: \closed", \neutral" and
\open". A country is considered closed when it imposes restrictions on at least
three of the four subcategories in KAOPEN. If there is at most one restriction
on the four subcategories in KAOPEN, the country is considered to be open.
When there are two restrictions out of four, the country is considered to have
a neutral openness policy. Since the subcategory capital account openness is
calculated over a ve year period, there are points in between the levels (See
Figure 1). Hence, we dene the following categories: \closed" = 0 for KAOPEN
below -1.1, \neutral" = 1 for KAOPEN between -1.1 and 1 and \open" = 2 for
KAOPEN above 1. Using this choice for the categories, we can write the gologit
model as
P(Yit > 0) = g(Xit0) =
exp(0 + Xit0)
1 + [exp(0 + Xit0)]
;
P(Yit > 1) = g(Xit1) =
exp(1 + Xit1)
1 + [exp(1 + Xit1)]
; (12)
where Yit is the categorical dependent variable taking values 0, 1 and 2. Xit
is a vector of independent variables corresponding to observation i at time t, 0
and 1 are vectors of coecients and 0 and 1 are constants.
From Equation (12) we can determine the probabilities that Y will take on
each of the values 0, 1 or 2 conditional on the explanatory variables
P(Yit = 0) = 1   g(Xit0)
P(Yit = 1) = g(Xit0)   g(Xit1)
P(Yit = 2) = g(Xit1):
The gologit model is a general specication, which nests more restrictive
models such as the ordered logit model (ologit). This ologit model is sometimes
referred to as proportional odds model. It is more restrictive because it assumes
0 = 1, i.e. it imposes the parallel lines assumption. Note that the gologit
model is able to nest this assumption for all or only subset of variables. When
only two categories are considered, the gologit model boils down to the familiar
logit model for binary data.
We incorporate dynamics in the gologit model to capture the persistence of
KAOPEN. This is done in a similar fashion as in Contoyannis et al. (2004),
who introduce dynamics in an ordered probit model. Moreover, we explicitly
incorporate starting values as suggested by Wooldridge (2005) to deal with
the initial conditions problem in nonlinear dynamic panel data models with
20unobserved heterogeneity. So, rewriting Equation (12) as
P(Yit > 0) =
exp(0 +  Xi;t 1jt 50 + Yi;t 50 + Yi;00 + t)
1 + exp(0 + Xi;t 1jt 50 + Yi;t 50 + Yi;00 + t)
;
P(Yit > 1) =
exp(1 +  Xi;t 1jt 51 + Yi;t 51 + Yi;01 + t)
1 + exp(1 + Xi;t 1jt 51 + Yi;t 51 + Yi;01 + t)
; (13)
where Yi;t 5 is the one period lag (ve years) of Yit and Yi;0 is the initial
value of Yit at time t = 1980. The matrix X contains the variable of interest,
the remittance/gdp ratio, and other control variables (the polity2 indicator to
capture institutional quality, the Wacziarg and Welch trade openness indicator
and the bank credit/ bank deposit ratio). All explanatory variables are calcu-
lated as ve year averages from t-5 until t-1, where an average is included if
the variable is available for at least three years in the t-1|t-5 time span. Time
dummies are added to the model to capture common time shocks.
By using t-1|t-5 averages we avoid a potential simultaneity bias since all
variables are now predetermined. However, they are not strictly exogenous.
Contoyannis et al. (2004) estimate a random eects ordered probit model,where
they take explicit care of unobserved heterogeneity using random eects. As
their sample is a typical micro panel, i.e. survey data, a random eects speci-
cation is more appropriate. However, in our case we are dealing with a macro
panel, where one may consider introducing xed eects to capture unobserved
heterogeneity. However, when countries do not change their nancial openness
during 1980-2005 this is already captured by initial conditions. Consequently,
by incorporating a large set of explanatory variables, initial conditions and time
dummies we aim to minimize the potential bias arising from unobserved hetero-
geneity.
4.3 Benchmark results
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of Equation (13) using ve speci-
cations, denoted (1),...,(5), on an unbalanced panel.16 For every specication
there are two columns with parameter estimates, indicated by 0-2 or 1-2. Since
KAOPEN is split into three categories, we estimate two slopes inbetween these
categories, i.e. from 0 to 1 and 1 to 2. When the coecients in columns 0-1
and 1-2 are equal, we have been able to impose slope homogeneity across the
categories.
The Brant test is used to determine for which variable slope homogeneity
16Table 6 in the Appendix shows the estimation results for a balanced panel. The balanced
sample consists of 43 countries. Both samples yield similar results.
21is imposed. First, the unrestricted model, i.e. without slope homogeneity, is
estimated. For each variable, the Brant test calculates a p-value to determine
if slope homogeneity is rejected or not. Second, we reestimate the model by
imposing slope homogeneity on the variable with the highest p-value. Third, the
Brant test is calculated again for all variables and we impose slope homogeneity
for the variable with the highest p-value as well, i.e. the model is reestimated
with slope homogeneity on two variables. This iterative procedure is continued
until slope homogeneity is rejected signicantly at 5% for all remaining variables
in the model. The tables in this paper report only the results from this nal
model. In Table 2 we assume slope homogeneity for all variables, except for the
small states variable.
Column(1) reports our baseline specication, where we account for dynam-
ics, initial conditions, the variable of interest remittances and several control
variables. First, accounting for dynamics is important when explaining the de-
terminants of nancial openness. Note that \closed" is our baseline category.
For both neutral and open capital account policies the lagged openness level is
an important positive determinant of current openness. This eect is especially
strong for a nancially open policy. Moreover, if a country is open in 1980, it is
very likely to remain open as shown by the large and positive coecient on the
initial condition.
The coecient on remittances is positive and signicant at the 1% level.
This implies that once a country receives more remittances, it will be more
likely to liberalize its capital account, ceteris paribus. Note that the coecients
on remittances are very stable across all specications.
Other control variables show that improved institutions increase the proba-
bility of nancial openness. Moreover, a liberalized trade policy has a positive
eect on nancial openness as well, which is in line with the literature showing
the importance of trade liberalization preceding nancial liberalization. More
bank credits relative to bank deposits have a positive impact on nancial open-
ness. This indicates that a more ecient domestic nancial system induces the
country to become more nancially open. Apparently, small states have an in-
creased probability to be open. However, the slope heterogeneity assumption
does not hold here, since the coecient for the 0-1 transition is insignicant.
In columns (2)-(5), other potential explanatory variables are added to the
baseline specication. In column (2) GDP per capita is added to investigate
if a country's standard of living aects its liberalization policy. This variable
turns out to be insignicant. Moreover, when including income dummies in
column (3), we also do not nd any relationship between the income level and
nancial openness. One reason for these ndings is that we capture GDP per






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23out relatively rich remain rich. Another factor that might play a role is the
occurrence of an endogeneity bias, since nancially liberalized countries tend to
grow faster (Bekaert et al., 2005).
Some authors argue that the legal origin of a country is related to nancial
openness (e.g. Brune and Guisinger, 2003). Although this is likely to be captured
by the initial conditions and/or institutional quality (La Porta et al., 1999), it
is explicitly included in column (4). However, the coecient on British legal
origin turns out to be insignicant. Unreported results show that a French legal
origin dummy is also insignicant.
As the bank credit over bank deposits ratio captures the general develop-
ment level of the nancial system, other variables may be included to capture
additional characteristics of a country's nancial development. In column (5)
we incorporate the private credit over GDP ratio, which shows how large the
nancial sector is relative to the economy. Some authors argue (see e.g. Braun
and Raddatz, 2007) that a large domestic nancial system may substitute for in-
ternational sources of capital nancing. Hence, a large domestic nancial sector
may result in a more closed nancial openness policy. The private credit over
GDP ratio has a negative coecient, which is in line with Braun and Raddatz
(2007), but this variable is insignicant.17
Model (1) is our baseline specication and captures the most relevant vari-
ables explaining nancial openness. However, there may be some distrust in
the results of the estimations in Table 2 due to a potential endogeneity bias.
Even though all variables are predetermined, they are not strictly exogenous.
Especially, we are concerned about the potential endogeneity of remittances.
The rst concern is reverse causality, since the cheaper it is to remit, the higher
will be remittances, ceteris paribus. Put dierently, if transaction costs are very
high, a migrant will not remit or remit a lower fraction of his income compared
to situation without transaction costs.
A second point of concern is a potential bias due to measurement error. As
the IMF/World Bank data only registers ocial ows, we miss those remittances
sent through unocial channels. The size of unocial remittances is likely to be
correlated with nancial openness, since unocial channels are not attractive
when transaction costs of ocial channels are small. In order to address these
concerns, we adopt an instrumental approach in the next section.
17The impossible trinity states that a country's government can pursue at most two out
of the following three policies: 1. A xed exchange rate, 2. Free capital ows and 3. An
independent monetary policy. This suggests to include the country's exchange rate regime
as a control variable. Unreported results, which are available upon request, show that the
exchange rate regime has no impact on nancial openness.
244.4 Instrumentation
Instrumental variable (IV) methods are a common approach to deal with endo-
geneity problems. In linear models, the literature guiding the use of instrumen-
tation is well developed and widespread. In particular, it is possible to use the
very popular two-stage least squares technique (2SLS), and for dynamic panel
data models, as in our case, the Arellano-Bover system GMM. Unfortunately,
in a nonlinear framework, it is not easy to nd a suitable method to account for
endogeneity and there appears to be some confusion around the application of
instrumental variable methods in this setting.
Very recently, Terza et al. (2008), address this issue. In the literature. there
are two instrumental variables-based approaches to correct for endogeneity in
non-linear models. The rst one is the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) and
the second one is the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS). 2SPS is very
similar to the linear 2SLS estimator. In the rst-stage of 2SPS, reduced form
regressions are estimated with any consistent estimation technique, then the
results are used to generate predicted values for the endogenous variables. In
the second-stage, the endogenous variables are replaced by their predicted values
obtained from the rst-stage. The 2SRI estimator has the same rst stage as
2SPS, but in the second stage the endogenous variables are not replaced by
their predicted values. Instead, the rst-stage residuals are included in the
second stage, reecting the component of the error term that is correlated with
the endogenous explanatory variables, and thereby correcting for endogeneity.18
Terza et al. (2008) support the use of 2SRI, showing that 2SRI is generally
statistically consistent in the broader class of non-linear model, whereas 2SPS
is not. Following their suggestion we use the 2SRI technique.19
A consistent estimation technique is required for rst-stage estimation. In
our context we apply a robust xed eect estimation, thereby accounting for
all time-constant variables explaining remittances, e.g. geographical charac-
teristics, colonial history, linguistic and cultural features of a migrants' origin
country.
Attempting to confront the endogeneity issue requires nding suitable in-
struments. To properly instrument remittances we need to nd variables that
must satisfy the following conditions: rst, they need to be suciently corre-
lated with the endogeneous variable (i.e. they must not be weak); and, second,
they can neither have a (direct) inuence on the dependent variable, capital ac-
count openness, nor be correlated with the error term in (13). Also, there must
18We recall that the essence of the endogeneity problem is the correlation between the
explanatory variable and the error term
19In not reported regressions, we used also the 2SPS technique. Results were in general
similar to the ones obtained with 2SRI, even if less robust in the balanced sample.
25be at least as many instruments as there are endogenous regressors. In our case,
we need one instrument for exact identication and at least 2 instruments for
overidentication.
Instrumental estimation of model (13) allows also to take into account mea-
surement errors in the key variable, i.e. the remittances variable. As explained
before, remittances are subject to measurement errors due to the fact that
informal remittances are not included in the ocial data. The size of this mea-
surement error is likely to vary across countries.
We consider as instruments for remittances, the (lagged) total emigration
rate to the six major OECD receiving countries, considering the Defoort (2008)
data set, and the growth rate of very young people (0-14) as a percentage of the
total population (data are taken from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators).
The emigration rate is positively correlated with remittances as a percentage
of GDP, as one expect that workers from abroad send money to their family at
home. At the aggregate level, therefore, the more workers migrate abroad, the
larger the amounts of remittances received by their home country. Freund and
Spatafora (2008) even argue that the stock of migrants in OECD countries is the
primary determinant of remittances.20 Growth rate of very young population is
supposed to be positively correlated with remittances, as family size increases,
and in particular with more children in the family, migrants spend less on them-
selves, and spend more on young family members, e.g. on education, in their
home country.
From our rst stage estimation in Table 3, we can see that the estimated
coecients of our instruments are positive and statistically signicant. They
have very high joint explanatory power, which can be inferred from the high
F-statistics for both the unbalanced and balances samples. This indicates that
our instruments are strong.21
The second requirement for valid instruments is that they can neither have
a (direct) inuence on the dependent variable, nancial openness, nor be corre-
lated with the error term. In our case, we think that this is the case for both
the lagged emigration rate and the growth rate of very young population.
If we do not see any direct correlation between our instruments and our de-
pendent variable, some indirect correlation can be claimed, but from our data,
this correlation appears quite weak. For example, as GDP per capita and in-
20The use of total emigration rate to the six major OECD countries as instrument for
remittances as a percentage of GDP is also in line with Singer (2009) who, in his study on
remittances and exchange regime policies, uses as instrument for remittances the ve-year
rolling average annual emigration to 15 advanced industrial countries, scaled by the sending
country's population.
21In general, practitioners consider instruments as strong when the F-statistic is larger than
ten.
26Table 3: First stage
variable unbalanced balanced
neutral (t-5) 0.00768** 0.00976**
(0.00332) (0.00385)
open (t-5) 0.00459 0.00433
(0.00542) (0.00655)
emigration rate (t-5) 0.684*** 0.673***
(0.136) (0.145)
growth rate young population 0.123** 0.129**
(0.0581) (0.0615)
institutional quality -0.000594* -0.000441
(0.000349) (0.000378)
trade openess -0.00124 -0.000333
(0.00552) (0.00666)




Number of countries 66 43
F-stat 29.76 25.24
p-value (F-stat) 0.000 0.000
partial R2 0.2526 0.2489
Note: Estimation of rst stage regression with remit-
tances/gdp as dependent variable using xed eects and ro-
bust standard errors. *,**,*** imply signicance at the 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
come dummies are not signicant in our benchmark estimation, we can exclude
that the growth rate of very young population is correlated with our dependent
variable through GDP per capita (population growth and GDP per capita are
negatively correlated, as rich countries usually have a lower population growth
rate). For the emigration rate, one can claim that the emigration rate is po-
tentially correlated with capital account openness through institutional quality,
considering capital account openness as a reection of institutions. There are
some papers assessing the relationship between migration and political institu-
tions (e.g. Spilimbergo, 2009). Even if in our estimation, institutional quality
is positive and highly signicant, nancial openness and institutional quality,
measured as a corrected indicator of democracy, are unconditionally uncorre-
lated (for instance, there are very open countries with low level of democracy),
therefore excluding a possible correlation between emigration rate and nancial
openness through institutional quality.22
In order to statistically test for correlation of our instruments with the error
term, an over-identifying restrictions test has been performed. This test is a
likelihood ratio test which compares the likelihood function of the two-stage
estimates with the likelihood function of a specication which additionally in-
cludes our instruments. This test conrms the validity of our instruments both
22We consider the unconditional correlation between Kaopen and the Polity2 measure from
the Polity IV data set. The correlation is 0.0713 with a p-value of 0.1395.
27for the unbalanced and the balanced sample.
Table 4 shows the second-stage gologit results. The estimated coecients of
the residuals are positive and statistically signicant in columns 0-1, negative
and less signicant in columns 1-2; they either test for endogeneity and capture
the component of the error term correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variables. Even correcting for endogeneity, the coecient on remittances is pos-
itive and highly signicant at the 1 % level, with only a minor lower estimated
coecient compared to our benchmark estimation, both in the unbalanced and
balanced sample. The residual variable in this second stage estimation is signi-
cantly dierent from zero in 3 out of the 4 equations reported in the Table. The
signicance of this variable can be seen as some indirect evidence of the need
to instrument the remittance variable. In turn, in the spirit of the well-known
Hausman test in the case of continuous models, this might provide indirect evi-
dence in favour of reverse causality between nancial openness and remittances.
This interpretation should be nevertheless taken with caution.23
Table 4: Instrumentation Second Stage Gologit
unbalanced balanced
variable 0-1 1-2 0-1 1-2
neutral (t-5) 1.167*** 1.167*** 1.322** 1.322**
(0.430) (0.430) (0.523) (0.523)
open (t-5) 3.937*** 3.937*** 3.666*** 3.666***
(0.687) (0.687) (0.770) (0.770)
neutral (1980) 0.859** 0.859** 0.287 0.287
(0.372) (0.372) (0.460) (0.460)
open (1980) 1.717** 1.717** 1.290 1.290
(0.851) (0.851) (0.854) (0.854)
remittances / gdp 13.19*** 13.19*** 14.01*** 14.01***
(4.299) (4.299) (4.058) (4.058)
institutional quality 0.0517** 0.0517** 0.0789** 0.0789**
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0332) (0.0332)
trade openess 0.988** 0.988** 1.198** 1.198**
(0.390) (0.390) (0.491) (0.491)
bank credit / bank deposits 0.969** 0.969** 2.866*** -0.484
(0.430) (0.430) (0.656) (0.872)
small states -0.608 2.551*** -1.259** 2.304***
(0.445) (0.627) (0.573) (0.833)
residual 33.08** -15.60 57.93*** -26.51*
(13.95) (15.89) (15.74) (15.24)
Observations 277 215
log likelihood -169.4 -121.3
pseudo R2 0.417 0.460
Overid (LR test, p-val) 0.141 0.257
Note: Estimation of Equation (13) using generalized ordered logit. The column
0-1 reports the slope between the closed and neutral nancial openness regime
and column 1-2 reports the slope between the neutral and open regime. *,**,***
imply signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
23In the same perspective, it is impossible to assess the degree of reverse causality in our
data from the mere comparison between estimates of Table 2 and of Table 4. The reason is
that with respect to the basic estimates of the gologit model, the IV estimates correct for two
dierent biases, i.e. the simultaneity bias and the measurement error one.
28Now initial conditions are less important than previous estimation for the
balanced sample. All the other results for our benchmark specication are
conrmed.
In order to assess the robustness of our results we treat the dependent vari-
able, nancial openness, as a continuous variable using two dierent estimation
techniques. First, we re-estimate our model using a linear 2SLS technique, con-
sidering the same set of instruments as before. Second, with the Arellano-Bover
system GMM, considering the lagged dependent variable as predetermined, and
remittances as endogenous and instrumented by their second and further lags.
The regression results are reported in Appendix B. Also in these cases our main
results are conrmed: the estimated coecient of remittances is positive and
signicant at usual statistically level in both cases.
One concern with the results of Tables 2 and 4 is the quality of the remit-
tances variable. As mentioned before, there is only data available for ocial
remittance ows, i.e. unocial remittances are not captured in the data. Sup-
pose all countries have a certain fraction of remittances received through infor-
mal channels in 1980. The potential eect on nancial openness is captured by
the initial conditions. Over time the fraction ocial vs. unocial remittances is
likely to increase. Due to nancial innovations, ocial transactions have become
cheaper since the 1980s. Consequently, we would expect that the increase in
ocial remittances is larger than the increase in total remittances. In this case,
the coecient on remittances in Tables 2 and 4 is underestimated and the eect
of remittances on capital account openness is even stronger than the estimated
one.
4.5 Marginal eects
From the estimated coecients in Table 4 it is possible to calculate marginal
eects. These marginal eects are calculated at the mean of each independent
variable for all categories. Table 5 shows these marginal eects for both the
unbalanced (left panel) and balanced sample (right panel). The interpretation
of the coecients is straightforward. Consider remittances in the unbalanced
panel, the coecient of about -3 implies that if the remittance over GDP ratio
increases by one percentage point (e.g. from 2 to 3 percent), then this decreases
the probability of ending up in a closed regime by 3 percentage points. Likewise,
a one percentage point increase in remittances/GDP results increases the prob-
ability of ending up in the category neutral (open) by 2 (1) percentage point(s).
These results show that countries which receive large amounts of remittances
from abroad are unlikely to be nancially closed, e.g. a ten percentage point
increase in remittances reduces the probability of being in a closed regime by
29thirty two percentage points.
The coecients on the lagged categories can be interpreted as transition
probabilities. If a country has a neutral nancial openness policy at t-5, it is
unlikely to end up in a closed regime at time t. Put dierently, the probability
of ending up in a closed regime is reduced by 27 percentage points if a country
has a neutral regime at t-5. This eect is even stronger when a country has
an open nancial policy at t-5 (-55 percentage points). Countries that have an
open nancial regime are likely to remain open. The probability of a country
to be open at time t, when it is open at time t-5, increases by 66.7 percentage
points.
Initial conditions do not seem to matter for the balanced sample, implying
that countries are not \stuck" in a regime. Instead they are able to switch
regimes when e.g. remittances increase strongly during the 1980-2005 period.
For the unbalanced sample initial conditions do seem to matter, e.g. if you
have a neutral regime in 1980 this increases the probability of being in a neutral
regime in the future by 13 percentage points. Moreover, the probability to end
up in a closed regime is reduced by 20 percentage points.
The quality of institutions has a positive eect on the probability of being
in a neutral or open regime, i.e. countries with good institutions are less likely
to have a closed nancial regime.
Financial openness appears to go hand in hand with trade openness. Coun-
tries with a closed trade policy are unlikely to have an open capital account
policy. This nding is related to McKinnon (1991) who argues that trade open-
ness is prerequisite for nancial openness. Empirical evidence in favor of this
reasoning has been provided by, among others, Chinn and It^ o (2006). The
ndings in Table 5 are in line with this reasoning.
Economically, the size of this eect is large. When a country liberalizes
its trade account, this reduces the probability of ending up in a closed regime
by about 24% (or 29% in the balanced sample). Therefore, an increase in the
remittance/gdp ratio of seven percentage points is similar in magnitude as a
change from a closed to open trade regime. Note that the relative importance
of trade openness and remittances is similar across nancial openness regimes.
With quite a few countries receiving remittances in excess of 10% of GDP, the
importance of remittances is very obvious.
A higher bank credit/bank deposits ratio lowers the probability of a coun-
try to be nancially closed. This implies that countries with more developed
nancial systems are more likely to have a neutral or open nancial policy.
Small countries have a higher probability of being either closed or open.
Apparently, governments of small states choose one of these extreme policies

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31In sum, Table 5 conrms the predictions of the positive eect of remittances
on a country's nancial openness policy. Moreover, the impact of remittances
on nancial openness is not only statistically signicant, but also economically
large.
5 Counterfactual analysis
In order to further assess the economic eect of remittances, we investigate what
the nancial openness policy of a country would be under dierent scenarios. By
keeping other country characteristics xed at their observed values and varying
only the amount of remittances received, the objective is to gain insight on the
economic importance of remittances. We consider two specic scenarios. In the
rst scenario we show how the distribution of nancial openness changes when
a country receives zero remittances. The second scenario investigates the case
when the amount of remittances received is doubled. We hypothesize, based
on the results obtained in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, that large remittance receiving
countries will have a lower nancial openness in the rst scenario and a higher
nancial openness under the second. Naturally, for countries receiving relatively
few remittances we do not expect large eects on nancial openness.
In Section 5.4 we calculated the marginal eects of each variable for the
average country in the sample. This provides insights on the eects of a change
in e.g. remittances for the \average country". Instead of using the average
country's data, here country specic data will be used to calculate the country
specic marginal eects. From these country specic characteristics, the esti-
mated model parameters and the distributional properties of the logit model,
we are able to calculate for each country individually the probabilities of ending
up in a specic nancial openness regime.24
The intuition of the technique is straightforward when illustrating it for an
individual country, say the Dominican Republic. The characteristics of this
country, when predicting its 2005 nancial openness regime, are as follows: 1)
Financial openness in 1980 was "closed" and in 2000 it was "neutral", 2) The
remittances/gdp ratio during 2000-2004 is 0.11, 3) It scored an 8 for institu-
tional quality during these years, 4) The country is open to trade, 5) Its bank
credit/bank deposit ratio during 2000-2004 is 1.43 and 6) it is considered to be
a small state. Under these conditions the model predicts the following regime
probabilities for the Dominican Republic in 2005: 7% "closed", 51% "neutral"
and 42% "open".
Since the Dominican Republic's remittances/gdp ratio is 11%, this will be
24The mfx postestimation command in Stata is used to calculate these probabilities.
32set to 0% in scenario 1 and doubled to 22% in scenario 2. Keeping all other
variables constant we now obtain the following probabilities in scenario 1: 25%
"closed", 61% "neutral" and 14% "open". Under scenario 2 this is: 2% "closed",
22% "neutral" and 76% "open". These numbers show the important impact
remittances have on the Dominican Republic's nancial openness policy regime.
Therefore, remittances strongly impact the prospects of ending up in either the
neutral or open regime. Based on the country's other characteristics there is a
relatively small, but not negligible, 25% probability of ending up in the closed
regime when no remittances are received.25
Figure 2 presents the changes in probabilities to end up in one of the 3
categories as a function of the average remittances/GDP ratio during 2000-
2004 when a country receives zero remittances. It is easy to see that the higher
the remittances/gdp ratio the higher the probability to become more closed.
All countries face an increase in the probability to move to a lower nancial
openness category.
Let us focus on some particular countries, as an example. Jamaica is in
an open regime in 2000 and receives a large amount of remittances relative to
GDP. In the case of zero remittances, the probability to end up in an open
regime widely decreases, while the probability to end up in a neutral regime
increases. The probability to end up in a closed regime will be slightly aected.
Consider now the Philippines, a country which is intermediate open in 2000
and receiving a large amount of remittances. We can see that both the proba-
bility to be in an open or neutral regime will decrease, while the probability to
end up in a closed regime increases. The same happens for countries with an
intermediate amount of remittances and which are in a closed regime in 2000,
such as Morocco.
On the opposite, the probabilities to end up in a certain regime will generally
not change when the remittances/GDP ratio is very low. For example, Mexico is
in an open regime in 2000 and does not receive that many remittances (in terms
of GDP only 2%, in absolute terms the gure is large), therefore its probability
to have an open regime is unaected in case it receives no remittances anymore.
Figure 3 presents the changes in probabilities to end up in one of the 3
categories as a function of remittances/GDP ratio in 2000 when the amount of
remittances received is doubled. In general, the results of scenario 2 show the
reverse pattern of scenario 1.
Countries such as Jamaica, which are open and receive already a large
amount of remittances, would face an increase in the probability to stay in
the open regime. It is interesting to note, that countries like Morocco and
25Table 8 shows in detail the probabilities for all the countries in the baseline case and the
two scenarios
33Figure 2: Scenario 1 (zero remittances)
34Figure 3: Scenario 2 (double remittances)
35Philippines instead, will strongly increase the probability to end up in a more
open category, i.e. neutral for Morocco and open for Philippines, and strongly
decrease the probability to remain in the current regime.
6 Conclusion
Workers' remittances have greatly increased during recent years, becoming a
signicant source of income for many developing countries. In addition to their
increasing size, the stability and counter-cyclicality of these ows make them an
important and reliable source of funds for developing countries. The importance
of remittances on human capital investments, poverty reduction, and macro-
economic stability has been widely recognized by researchers and policymakers.
Therefore, it is attractive for remittance receiving countries to liberalize their
capital account and increase their nancial openness in order to attract more
remittances through formal channels. Hence, remittances can have an important
direct eect on a developing countries' nancial openness.
In this paper we investigate the link between remittance receipts and nan-
cial openness for a sample of 66 mostly developing countries from 1980-2005.
Empirically we use a dynamic generalized ordered logit model to establish the
link between remittances and nancial openness. In addition, we apply a two-
-step method akin to two stage least squares to deal with the potential endo-
geneity of remittances.
We nd a highly positive eect of remittances on nancial openness, i.e.
the more remittances a country receives, the more likely it will be nancially
open. This positive eect is statistically signicant and economically large.
Through counterfactual experiments, we show that the probability to be nan-
cially opened is higher ceteris paribus for countries which receive a considerable
amount of remittances.
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41Appendix B: Robustness using System GMM
and 2SLS
Table 7: Robustness using System GMM and 2SLS
unbalanced balanced
variable SGMM 2SLS SGMM 2SLS
kaopen (t-5) 0.503*** 0.208** 0.567*** 0.244**
(0.131) (0.0942) (0.154) (0.110)
remittances / gdp 14.92** 24.27*** 8.486** 26.13***
(5.813) (7.055) (4.056) (7.309)
institutional quality 0.0272** -0.0230 0.0233 -0.0338
(0.0136) (0.0218) (0.0147) (0.0227)
trade openess 0.366* 0.852*** 0.409* 0.910***
(0.201) (0.256) (0.205) (0.275)
bank credit / bank deposits 0.416** 0.777*** 0.445** 1.011***
(0.208) (0.222) (0.219) (0.221)
small states 0.272 0.293
(0.449) (0.474)
Observations 277 276 215 215
Number of countries 66 65 43 43
Number of instruments 32 32
AR(2) 0.280 0.218
Hansen J (p-value) 0.172 0.163 0.194 0.295
R-squared 0.355 0.401
F-statistic 30.25 25.88
Underidentication (p-value) 0.000255 0.000368
Estimation of Equation (13) using System GMM and 2SLS. *,**,*** imply sig-
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